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This paper explores the effect on costs when firms within an industry must interact with each
other in the normal course of business.  Such interaction will generally cause the socially optimal scale
of each firm to deviate from its minimum average cost scale.  In addition, the socially optimal industry
structure may be more concentrated than conventional firm-level cost studies would suggest and may
also differ from the unregulated (free-entry) equilibrium structure.  These concepts, while potentially
applicable to several industries, are here made more precise for the banking industry, both theoretically
and empirically.  NETWORK DISECONOMIES AND OPTIMAL STRUCTURE
Public policy toward industrial structure has traditionally adhered to the neoclassical
assumption that an industry can efficiently supply a growing market at constant marginal cost through
the entry of new, optimal-sized firms over time.  However, to the extent that firms within an industry
must interact with each other, as is true of many service industries, the costs of that interaction may
be an increasing function of the total number of firms in the industry.  Such interfirm network
diseconomies may have at least three results.  First, unit costs will rise as the market grows, even if
individual firms are at their efficient scale.  Second, the socially optimal scale of each firm may
deviate from its minimum average cost scale, once these network diseconomies are taken into account.
Third, the socially optimal industry structure may be more concentrated than conventional firm-level
cost studies would suggest, and may also differ from the unregulated (free-entry) equilibrium structure.
This paper explores these concepts theoretically and empirically in the specific context of the
banking industry.  Evidence emerges that U.S. banking may exhibit network diseconomies, with
important implications for both equilibrium structure and optimal public policy.  The empirical results
also incorporate what appears to be the first test of agglomeration effects in the banking industry,
identifying both localization diseconomies and urbanization economies.
1.  Background
Previous studies of network effects have focused largely on issues of compatibility, innovation,
consumer demand, and competition (see, for example, pathbreaking studies by Farrell and Saloner,
1985; Katz and Shapiro, 1985, 1986; or the survey by Economides, 1996).  The aspects of interfirm2
networking considered here, by contrast, may be essentially transparent to the consumer and primarily
affect a firm’s costs.  Examples of industries exhibiting interfirm networking in fact or in principle
include the postal service, telecommunications, airlines, and banking.   A primary characteristic of
1
such industries, relevant to this study and in contrast to many previous studies, is that consumers value
coverage (access to all endpoints) of an exogenous network or market, rather than the size of that
network (number of endpoints) per se.  For example, when mailing a letter, writing a check, or making
a telephone call, a consumer needs a service provider that can deliver the letter, effect payment, or
complete the call to any potential recipient.  Similarly, a traveler wants to be able to reach any desired
destination.  
In the situations considered here, we will assume that the demand for global coverage is either
absolute or at least sufficiently inelastic that any equilibrium market outcome will yield global
coverage.   Given such global access or coverage, the consumer may be indifferent to whether a single
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provider maintains direct links with all endpoints or instead must interact with one or more other firms
to reach a particular endpoint, at least insofar as such interactions are transparent to the consumer.  For
example, if a traveler must change airplanes en route to a given destination, she may be indifferent to
using one airline versus two for the same trip as long as the fare and travel times are the same.
Similarly, a consumer mailing a letter may not care whether the postal service chooses to subcontract
part of the delivery to third parties, as long as the letter arrives promptly and intact.  As long as the
industry provides global access by some combination of means, the size of the network and the
structure of the industry do not affect consumer demand.  Therefore, only cost considerations will
influence firms’ choice of scale and scope or (assuming that competitive pricing can be assured)
societal preferences regarding industry structure.  3
If a firm in one of these industries hopes to avoid the need for systematic interaction with its
rivals as an intrinsic step in the provision of the service, it must establish its own direct links with
every endpoint to compete effectively.  In this regard, the problem considered here is similar to the
interconnected networks problem of Laffont et al. (1996), in which each firm controls a bottleneck (its
own customers) to which rivals must have access, and in which the interconnections render a
consumer indifferent to the relative sizes of the firms.  However, Laffont et al. focus on the pricing
equilibria of such cases, whereas this paper--like Radner’s (1992) analysis of hierarchies--focuses on
the resulting characteristics of cost.  Because it confronts an industry with the need to choose between
markets (interfirm linkages) and hierarchies (intrafirm networks) in serving its clientele, the problem
considered here also constitutes an application of Williamson’s (1975) analysis and is thereby related
not only to Radner’s (1992) study but also to Neave’s (1991) interpretation of financial industry
structure in terms of markets and hierarchies.  Neave focuses on the costs and capabilities of
governance mechanisms in financial firms and, secondarily (as in his Chapter 5), on asset-side
transactions; by contrast, although our empirical section can reflect the various contributions to costs
of asset, liability, and governance operations, our theoretical banking model focuses on a subset of
liability-side transactions.
Although the focus of this paper is on the cost effects of interfirm linkages, there may well be
competitive or pricing effects as well.  Firms that choose to maintain direct connections to each
endpoint will face their rivals in each geographic market, with behavioral effects that have been
analyzed in the literature on multimarket contacts.  The alternative structure of maintaining interfirm
linkages can reduce the number of multimarket contacts but may have additional competitive effects
that have yet to be studied.4
Different industries have chosen different structures to solve the linkage problem.  UPS and
Federal Express have established the capability of delivering to any domestic location, while
competing long-distance telecommunication companies must connect with local monopoly switching
systems to provide their service.  We assume compatibility among interacting firms in such cases,
unlike previous studies that treat compatibility as a strategic choice variable.
Exogeneity of the relevant network is crucial to our focus.  The technology of providing a
service may suffer aggregate diseconomies of scale beyond some level; yet, when the total population
grows beyond that level, the industry cannot exclude new citizens from its scope, and therefore cannot
limit its overall scale to the minimum-cost level.  The postal service and telecommunications
companies cannot reasonably restrict their coverage to a subset of the population residing in their
coverage areas, nor can a commercial bank limit its acceptance of checks to those written by or to a
selected few parties.  Moreover, these industries face an exogenously growing population over time.
Globalization and the erosion of local geographic market boundaries contribute to a further increase
in the effective market size.
It is realistic to expect that diseconomies of scale may characterize one or more of these
industries.  Casual observation suggests that the postal service may operate in a region of decreasing
returns, comparing service level and costs over the past few decades.  In the 1950s, letters traveled
coast to coast in a day or two at a cost of 3 or 4 cents, with twice-daily home delivery, without benefit
of high-speed jet aircraft or high-speed automated sorting technology, and without the consumer
inconvenience of ZIP codes.  Today, the cost of a first-class postage stamp is twice as high in real
terms, the average transit time longer and more variable, the frequency of delivery lower, and postal
codes increasing in length every few years (two digits when introduced, then five, now nine)--despite5
technological progress and privatization to realign incentives.  The main variable driving this apparent
deterioration seems to be the sheer volume of mail, occasioned by both the 60 percent growth in U.S.
population over the period and the increased use of mail for commercial advertising.
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In banking, interfirm linkages operate at several levels--on the asset side (for example, loan
participations), the liability side (for example, payment transactions), or a mixture of the two (as with
interbank lending--the so-called fed funds market).  In addition, interbank linkages arise with financial
services such as correspondent bank relationships to provide electronic payments, check processing,
coin and currency, and securities wire transfer services.  
On the liability side, the ratio of interbank payment transactions (so-called "transit"
transactions) to "on-us" transactions is an increasing function of the number of banks in the market.
(This property will be explicitly calculated in the next section under the assumption of isotropic
exchange.)  To the extent that the receiving bank and the paying bank must duplicate certain steps in
the processing of a single transit transaction, the total cost of that transaction will exceed the cost of
an otherwise equivalent on-us transaction.  Where cost considerations dictate the use of a clearing
facility (such as the Federal Reserve or a correspondent bank) rather than direct presentment between
the paying and receiving banks, an additional institution is imposed in the chain with its attendant
costs.  
On the asset side, loan participations and loan sales generate comparable interfirm linkages.
If participating or acquiring banks or their agents perform independent credit analysis, costly
duplication of effort is involved; if not, the participating or acquiring banks are exposed to moral
hazard from the originating or lead bank.  In addition, Broecker (1990) and Nakamura (1993) have
identified an indirect cost of multiple-bank markets in terms of declining credit quality and increased6
loan losses resulting from loans granted to applicants previously rejected at other banks.  Structural
consolidation is occurring at a rapid pace among U.S. banks (including the very largest) amid claims
of analysts and practitioners of potential cost savings, despite the findings of most empirical cost
studies that scale economies are exhausted beyond some smaller scale (Berger and Humphrey,
1992b).   The analysis below suggests that network diseconomies may potentially account for at least
4
part of this seeming contradiction.
Standard empirical cost studies explore how a firm’s costs change as the firm changes scale
or product mix, holding constant the number and other characteristics of rival firms.  That approach
fails to consider that the entry of new firms may impose higher interfirm networking costs on each
incumbent or that the exit of incumbents (whether by merger or by failure) may reduce the interfirm
networking costs to each surviving firm.  Thus, when conventional studies suggest that a larger market
should be supplied by additional firms rather than larger firms, they neglect the possibility that the
increased networking costs resulting from entry may outweigh the higher unit costs resulting from
increasing the size of a fixed number of firms.  That is, in the presence of costly interfirm networking,
the socially optimal structure may be more concentrated than the simple firm cost function would
suggest and may require each firm to operate in a region of diseconomies of scale.  This issue must
be explored to establish valid public policy implications of empirical findings of diseconomies of scale
in particular industries.  
5
This paper broadens the concept of cost structure to incorporate interfirm network effects,
demonstrating how they alter the theoretical calculation of the socially optimal and unregulated
equilibrium industry structures and presenting exploratory empirical evidence from a sample of U.S.7
commercial banks.  The empirical findings are consistent with the theory and suggest that hitherto
overlooked networking costs may have important implications for public policy.
Before proceeding to a formal model, we note one property alluded to in the introduction.  To
expand its aggregate output, an industry must attain larger firms, more firms, or both.  If interfirm
networking is required and has a positive cost, the average cost will be an increasing function of the
number of firms (as explored in the model below).  Likewise, if firms have a U-shaped average cost
structure, average cost is an increasing function of firm scale beyond some point.  Thus, beyond some
point, further expansion of an industry’s aggregate output must drive up the average cost, whether that
expansion is attained by expanding each firm or by entry.  That is, interfirm networking can
undermine the neoclassical ability of an industry to maintain constant marginal cost at any aggregate
scale by means of entry of optimal-sized firms.  This property is related to the decreasing returns to
scale previously noted for certain efficient hierarchical networks by Radner (1992).
2.  A Model of Payment System Networking Among Banks
To illustrate the properties of interest, we depict a simple model of a payment system network
comprising n banks.  As noted above, banks can or must interact in a variety of ways.  Here we focus
on just one of these elements to permit precise characterization of the process.  Though derived for
banks, the model may roughly characterize some other service industries also.
For the most part, we shall work with a symmetric structure in which each bank processes
identical numbers of accounts and transactions, and in which transactions are uniformly distributed
among accounts.  This assumption of isotropic exchange parallels that in Laffont et al. (1996) and
McAndrews and Roberds (1997).  To isolate the network diseconomies per se, we posit a fixed8
aggregate number of accounts, M, and of net or "endpoint" transactions per unit of time, m.  For
example, each depositor writes a fixed number of checks per month, some on other accounts in the
same bank (commonly called "on-us" transactions) and the rest on accounts in other banks ("transit"
transactions), with the mix between on-us and transit transactions determined by the bank’s market
share measured by the number of accounts.  We shall quantify how networking among banks
unambiguously increases the total number of transactions by layering intermediate (i.e., transit)
transactions onto the fixed base of m endpoint transactions.
The essential feature of the model is an explicit accounting of how m total endpoint
transactions are apportioned and linked among the n banks.  It will be necessary to distinguish between
incoming transit and outgoing transit transactions, even though the banking industry reports only the
latter of these components (e.g., in the Functional Cost Analysis survey administered by the Federal
Reserve).  A check deposited in bank A and drawn on an account in bank B will be considered as both
an outgoing transit transaction with respect to bank A and an incoming transit transaction with respect
to bank B.  Here, "outgoing" and "incoming" refer to the direction in which interbank authorizations--
not funds--flow.  A distinctive feature of transit transactions is that they each show up at least twice,
once at the outgoing bank and again at the incoming bank.  If an intermediary such as a clearinghouse,
the Federal Reserve, or a correspondent bank is used, such a transaction will move through at least
three institutions.
The cost function analyzed here does not explicitly model the interbank market and is
consistent with any given combination of direct interbank linkages and clearing houses (including
endogenously developed combinations, with or without the check clearing role of the Federal
Reserve).  If banks have capacity constraints on their ability to deal directly with each other, a cost-9
minimizing structure will involve multiple vertical layers of interaction among banks, quantitatively
exacerbating the network diseconomies analyzed below; we do not model this more extreme case.
Numbers of Transactions
In the symmetric structure with n banks, each bank holds a(n) = M/n accounts and directly
encounters m/n transactions with the public each period, not including incoming transit transactions
from other banks.  Of these m/n transactions, a fraction 1/n will be on-us and the remainder will be
outgoing transit, under the assumptions.  The corresponding numbers of transactions per bank are b(n)
= m/n  on-us and c(n) = (n - 1)m/n  outgoing transit.  At the same time, the bank receives incoming
22
transit transactions corresponding to a fraction 1/(n - 1) of each other bank’s outgoing transit
transactions.  As there are (n - 1) other banks, the total number of incoming transit transactions for a
given bank is therefore (n - 1)m/n , the same as the number of outgoing transit transactions.  In
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aggregate, the total number of incoming transactions must equal the number of outgoing transactions;
in the symmetric case, this equality must also hold for each bank individually.  The total number of
transit transactions per bank, including both incoming and outgoing, is 2(n - 1)m/n .  The number of
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all transactions, including both transit and on-us, is (2n - 1)m/n  per bank.  In practice, the numbers
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of accounts and transactions will vary across banks and stochastically over time; we shall shortly relax
the assumption of symmetry across banks, but will ignore stochastic variation for clarity of exposition.
Aggregated across all banks, the total number of transactions in the industry equals m/n on-us
transactions plus 2m(1 - 1/n) transit transactions, or m(2 - 1/n) transactions in all. As the number of
banks increases from n to n+1, total transactions increase by m/(n  + n), which is positive for all n >
2
0.  That is, not surprisingly, spreading a given number of endpoint transactions among a larger number10
of banks will entail additional intermediary (or transit) transactions and thereby increase the total
number of transactions processed in the economy.  
The implications of this elementary networking property for costs and optimal industry
structure depend on details of the technology.  In a neoclassical industry without networking, the
socially optimal structure allows each firm to operate at its minimum average cost, in a region of
locally constant returns to scale (except in the case of natural monopoly).  With the networking effects
characterized above, by contrast, it is straightforward to show that the number of banks at which total
industry cost is minimized can require each bank to operate in a region of diseconomies of scale,
whenever the cost of processing transit transactions is sufficiently large relative to the cost of
processing on-us transactions.  This property is explored in the next section.
In the (partially) asymmetric case in which firm i processes m (rather than m/n) endpoint i
transactions and each other firm i û j processes m endpoint transactions (m = constant for all i û j), jj
the number of on-us transactions processed by firm i is m /[m + (n - 1)m].  The number of incoming ii j
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transit transactions is mm(n - 1)/[m + (n - 1)m] and the number of outgoing transit transactions is ij i j
the same.  In this case, note that changing the number of accounts in bank i directly alters its number
of on-us and outgoing transit transactions, but also indirectly changes its number of incoming transit
transactions.  The share of on-us transactions, as a fraction of all transactions, is m/[m + 2(n - 1)m] ii j
for bank i.  These results will be needed in the following sections.
Cost Structure
In the most general case, total costs will vary with the number of accounts as well as with the
number of transactions.  Each account entails such fixed costs as keeping records, filing statements,11
and monitoring account balances.  In addition, we may suppose that the cost of processing an on-us
transaction can differ from that of processing a transit transaction.  The fact that banks have chosen
not to report incoming transit transactions separately from outgoing transit transactions in their cost
accounting suggests that there are no meaningful distinctions in the unit cost of processing the two
types of transit transactions.  In the symmetric case in which firms have identical but general cost
functions, therefore, we can represent the total cost of bank i as:
(1) TC = C(a(n), b(n), c(n)) i
which is a monotone increasing function of each argument a(n), b(n), and c(n) as defined in the
previous section.   Total industry cost is just TC = nTC in the symmetric case.  For given aggregate
6
i
M and m, total industry cost is minimized by the value of n at which 0 = TC + nMTC/Mn, or: ii
(2) 0  =  TC  - (M/n)C (.) - (2m/n )C (.) + (2- n)(m/n )C (.) i1 2 3
2 2
if the second-order condition holds (i.e., if the Hessian of C(.)  is positive definite), where C  j
denotes the first partial derivative of C(.) with respect to its jth argument. 
Comparing this condition to the property of firm-level scale economies requires mild
additional assumptions since the distinction between transactions and accounts essentially means that
the bank is a multiproduct firm, even if it offers only a single type of account.  We therefore adopt the
neutral assumption that endpoint transactions are proportional to the number of accounts, or m =  M ii
for each bank.    Since the number of accounts is a stock figure whereas transactions are a flow, it is
712
possible to normalize the time interval under consideration such that   = 1, and we adopt this
convention.   Conventional scale economies are defined for bank i taking m as given. For the values
8
j
of b(n) and c(n) given in the previous section, the scale elasticity of cost is:
(3) (m / TC) MTC/Mm = mC /C + (mC /C)[m  + (n - 1)mm] / [m + (n - 1)m]   i i i i i 1 i 2 i i j i j
22
+ (mC /C)m (n - 1) / [m + (n - 1)m] i3 j i j
22  2
where the arguments of the bank’s cost function C(.) have been suppressed for brevity.  Expression
(3) equals or exceeds 1 if there are constant or decreasing returns to scale, respectively, and is less than
1 if there are economies of scale.  
To explore conditions under which the socially optimal industry structure entails diseconomies
of scale at the firm level, we note that equation (2)--the condition for social optimality–-can be
rewritten as:
(4) C = mC /n + 2mC /n  - (2 - n)mC /n 12 3
22
while the condition (3) > 1--reflecting diseconomies of scale--can be expressed in the symmetric case
(where m = m = m/n) as: ij
(5) C < mC /n + mC /n  + (n - 1) mC /n . 12 3
22 313
Conditions (4) and (5) are simultaneously satisfied only if the right-hand side of (5) exceeds that of
(4) or, equivalently, if: 
(6) C   >  nC .   32
Condition (6) is thus the necessary and sufficient condition in this framework for the socially optimal
industry structure to entail diseconomies of scale at the firm level.   To explore the likelihood of this
9
outcome, we first note that condition (6) holds for m sufficiently large relative to n, given C  > 0 and 2
C  > 0.  There are nearly 10,000 commercial banks in the U.S., besides several thousand other 3
depository institutions.  Because of localized markets, not every institution competes with all others.
Nevertheless, the deconcentrated structure of U.S. banking, in conjunction with condition (6), may
imply a socially optimal industry structure that exhibits diseconomies of scale at the firm level in U.S.
banking even if C  is substantially smaller than C .  32
A major caveat is that this model abstracts from the costs of banks’ other services (such as
lending), which may not exhibit the same degree of networking.  Moreover, the ratio m/n is smaller
for some other networked services, such as large-payment electronic wire transfers, possibly leading
to a violation of condition (6); such factors would tend to offset the conclusion of the previous
paragraph or even cause firm-level economies of scale at the socially optimal industry structure.  
Nevertheless, the policy implications of the foregoing calculations are striking.  They imply
that, unless other factors offset the pattern of networking costs among transaction accounts, we should
expect that socially beneficial consolidation could occur in the U.S. banking industry, and perhaps in
other large economies as well, beyond the point at which surviving banks are observed to be operating14
in a region of diseconomies of scale.  Any offset would have to be exact if the classical result of
locally constant returns to scale at the social optimum is to be preserved, an outcome that occurs on
a set of measure zero.  Previous empirical banking research has focused on the firm-level cost
structure without taking account of network interactions, and has thereby overlooked a class of effects
that the above analysis suggests should be significant.  
An Example with Constant Marginal Costs
To characterize the quantitative and qualitative impact of interfirm networking on optimal
industry structure more precisely, we must introduce additional assumptions about the bank’s cost
function.  We shall consider an example with constant returns to scale to isolate the role of network
diseconomies, in contrast to the situation explored in the previous section where diseconomies of scale
could arise.  
In the simplest case, assume that each on-us transaction has a constant marginal cost k > 0,
each transit transaction (incoming or outgoing) has a constant marginal cost K > 0, and there are no
other costs.  This means, in particular, that the cost of a given number of incoming transit transactions
is independent of the number of originating institutions, an assumption that is conservative because
the marginal cost of an additional respondent bank is actually likely to be positive rather than zero,
ceteris paribus.  The total cost of each bank is TC = km/n  + 2K(n - 1)m/n , based on the numbers of
22
transactions derived above, while the total social or aggregate cost is nTC = km/n + 2K(n - 1)m/n. 
As the number of banks increases from n to n + 1, maintaining symmetry and holding m fixed,
the aggregate total cost changes by m(2K - k)/(n  + n), which takes the sign of 2K - k.  The aggregate
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cost is therefore lower in the less concentrated industry structure if and only if the marginal cost of an15
on-us transaction is more than twice as high as that of a single transit transaction.  This result is
intuitive because each transit transaction must be processed twice (once at each end), whereas each
on-us transaction is processed only once.  At the extremes of structural concentration, aggregate cost
reduces to km for monopoly (n = 1, where all transactions are on-us) and approaches 2Km as n 6 4
(where all transactions are transit).  It is also apparent from these expressions that no interior
extremum exists for aggregate costs in the linear case, but either an atomistic structure or monopoly
will minimize social costs, depending on the relative magnitudes of K versus k.
Typically, we might expect to observe k > K, because a single transit transaction does not
involve every part of a complete on-us transaction and should therefore be less costly.   We should
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also expect to observe k < 2K, since there is some duplication of steps (and therefore of costs) between
an outgoing transit transaction and an incoming transit transaction, and because k > 2K would imply
that it is cheaper to split up every transaction between two banks than to route it through a single bank.
Thus, to summarize, we should expect to find K < k < 2K in practice.  In this case, the industry would
be a natural monopoly from the standpoint of aggregate total costs, despite constant returns to scale
at the individual bank level--again an intuitive (though extreme) outcome since, when each
combination of one outgoing and one incoming transit transaction is more costly than an on-us
transaction, the monopoly structure minimizes aggregate costs by avoiding all transit transactions. 
Entry Considerations
Determining the socially optimal industry structure is a separate issue than whether a free-entry
equilibrium will attain that structure.  In fact, within the linear framework of the previous section, it16
is easy to show that the monopoly structure is not sustainable against small-scale entry.  Let bank i be
a monopoly incumbent and bank j be an entrant.  The incumbent’s average cost is:
(7) AC = (km + 2Km)/(m + 2m) ii j i j
and similarly for the entrant.  The difference between the two average costs is:
(8) AC - AC = 2(k - K)(m + m)(m - m)/[(m + 2m)(m + 2m )] i j i j i j ij ji
which has the sign of m - m.  Thus, if m > m, then AC > AC, so that a small-scale entrant has a cost ij i j i j
advantage relative to the incumbent and will be able to underprice the incumbent and attract market
share.  
This example carries several salient implications.  First, it demonstrates that network
diseconomies can have an asymmetric impact on the costs of individual banks, if banks have different
market shares.  Second, it establishes that excess entry can occur, even if it has the effect of driving
up costs for all firms in the industry.  Note that the average cost of each bank can be an increasing
function of the scale of either bank: MAC/Mm = 2m(k - K)/(m + 2m)  > 0, since k > K, while ii j i j
2
M AC/Mm = [2m(K - k) + 4mK(m - 1)]/(m + 2m) , which can take either sign but is positive for some ij i j i i j
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ranges of parameter values (and similarly when i and j are interchanged).  Third, the example
illustrates that network diseconomies can make the scale of operations interdependent among banks
in a way that violates the standard assumptions of empirical cost functions and duality theory,
potentially biasing conventional cost estimates.  Thus, the effect of network diseconomies is not only17
to drive a wedge between firm-level scale economies and optimal industry structure (as analyzed in
the previous section) but also to distort empirical firm-level cost functions themselves.
An aspect of these properties that may have special relevance for the U.S. banking industry is
that any firms not subject to the exogenous networking requirement but able to compete for certain
of the services traditionally provided by banks could enter selected product markets and enjoy a lower
cost by avoiding the networking.  For example, as the economy grows, the unit cost of providing
payments system services such as checking accounts may increase.  If this cost cannot be fully passed
on to the depositor, demand deposits will become more costly over time relative to alternative sources
of funds.  Eventually other firms that do not rely on core deposits, such as finance companies, may
come to enjoy a cost advantage over traditional banks in the production of loans.  Conversely, if the
cost of networking is passed on to the depositors, alternative institutions that limit their participation
in costly networking may be able to attract some depositors away from banks, with Merrill Lynch’s
sweep account providing an example.
3.  Empirical Framework
The analysis in the previous sections strongly suggests that U.S. banks should exhibit
observable network diseconomies.  In this section we estimate a simple extension of a standard
empirical cost function to explore whether the data are consistent with this phenomenon.  The test
focuses on metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) as delineating local geographic banking markets,
without attempting to capture additional networking effects involving broader regions.  Previous
research and current regulatory practice both use MSAs as a common proxy for banking markets (see
for example Whitehead, 1980 and Jackson, 1992), so it is believed that the primary networking effects18
(especially among demand deposits) will occur within these regions.  If a measurable network cost
effect can be observed within a typical MSA, any additional network effects involving broader regions
would only serve to strengthen the overall impact of networking on banks’ costs.  Within this
framework, we shall measure the extent of networking alternately by the number of banks operating
in the MSA and by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of concentration (HHI, the sum of squared market
shares) of bank deposits within the MSA.  The HHI reflects the degree of asymmetry in bank sizes
within the market, unlike the simple number of banks.
Although the model in section 2 portrayed costs as a function of the numbers of accounts and
transactions, the majority of recent empirical banking cost studies have used the dollar volume of
various subsets of assets and liabilities as the measure of scale (see footnote 6).  Because numbers of
accounts and transactions are not reported for most banks, and in view of the strong positive
relationship between numbers of accounts and transactions versus dollar volume, we adhere to the
standard empirical practice in this section.  We measure the scale of a bank as the outstanding dollar
amounts of commercial and industrial loans, consumer loans, other loans, and securities and fed funds
sold, as in the intermediation model.  
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Although our extension controls for the number and relative scale of rival banks in each
market, it maintains the conventional assumption that these factors are exogenous to each bank.  The
analysis of the previous section demonstrates that this is not strictly correct in the presence of network
diseconomies, so the model fitted below should be regarded as a qualitative indicator of whether
network effects may be present, rather than as a precise quantification of those effects.  Nevertheless,
measuring scale by dollars of assets rather than by numbers of transactions should minimize the19
distortion resulting from the interdependence between a bank’s volume of transactions and the number
of its local rivals.
The empirical model must control for agglomeration effects, given the focus of this study.
Previous research (for example, Carlino, 1979; Moomaw, 1988; Calem and Carlino, 1991) has found
that manufacturing firms’ cost structures are affected by the size and characteristics of the communities
in which they operate, for reasons other than network diseconomies, and it is reasonable to expect that
similar effects may also occur in a service industry such as banking.  For example, in a large city,
economies of scale in complementary or support industries can drive costs down while congestion
costs can have the opposite effect.  If we did not control for such effects, they could possibly either
mimic or else mask network diseconomies in our framework.
To control for agglomeration effects, each MSA’s population and proportion of high school
graduates were included as additional regressors in the model.  In this framework, the quality of labor
force education is measured as the percentage of the MSA's population above 18 years of age that
graduated from high school.  The present study, by adding network diseconomies to the recognized
set of cost factors and applying the test to a firm-level sample of banking data, will also shed new light
on previously unexplored agglomeration costs specific to the banking industry.
Sample
Our sample was drawn from all U.S. commercial banks operating exclusively within a single
MSA as of year-end 1990, based on the location of branches accepting deposits. Banks less than five
12
years old were excluded from the sample because such banks typically have portfolio compositions
and cost structures quite different from those of more mature banks.  The year 1990 was chosen to20
coincide with the most recent available census population data for each bank’s MSA.  Previous
research has found that the choice of year does not affect the estimates of scale economies in banking
(Humphrey, 1990).  Table 1 presents summary statistics on the data.
Banks with total assets less than $3 million or larger than $3 billion were excluded from the
sample because of under-representation and for other reasons.  Banks larger than $3 billion that
maintain offices only within a single MSA are essentially wholesale in focus and are neither typical
of the commercial banking industry nor subject to the same payment system networking phenomena
that characterize a full-service, general-purpose bank.  In addition, McAllister and McManus (1993)
demonstrate that econometric problems can result from fitting a single specification across too large
a range of scale (also implied in Barnett and Lee, 1985).  Finally, White (1980, p. 154) has shown that
a skewed sample distribution yields inconsistent OLS estimators, and truncating the two tails leaves
a much less skewed sample distribution.  
Because previous research has indicated that unit banks and branch banks face differing cost
structures, and because the network aspects of unit banks and branch banks differ, we estimated
separate cost functions for these two groups of banks.   The branch bank equation was fitted to 1971
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banks while the unit bank equation was fitted to 877 banks.   Together, these two subsamples spanned
14
292 MSAs.
In any study of this type, spanning a large number of discrete markets, one must choose
between fixed-effects and random-effects models in the treatment of the individual MSAs.  Maddala
(1987) has shown that, when the sample is not identical with the population of interest, inferences
about true population values are more efficiently carried out by random-effects models than by fixed-
effects models (see also Emmons, 1993, page 193).  Since single-market banks operating in MSAs21
are a proper subset of the population of interest, and since many MSAs contain only one bank in each
of our subsamples, we estimate only random-effects models.
The Estimating Equations
The functional form for each group was the standard translog, which has been the most widely
used form for empirical cost studies in recent years.  The translog cost function, augmented by
agglomeration terms and proxies for network structure, is defined as:
                                         4 3 4    4 3     3      4    3 3
(9) ln C =   +    Q +    P +  ½       QQ  + ½       PP +       QP +    X oi ij j i k i k j k j k i j i jh h
                               
i=1 j=1 i=1 k=1 j=1 k=1 i=1  j=1 h=1
where:
C   = total costs (including both interest and noninterest expenses)
Q  = (ln q - ln ) denotes the quantity of output i, where ln  is the sample mean of  ii i i  
ln q; i
Q   = commercial and industrial loans; 1
Q   = consumer loans; 2
Q   = other loans; 3
Q   = securities plus federal funds sold; 4
  P  = (ln p - ln )  denotes the price of input j, where ln  is the sample mean of ln p; jj j j j
P   = price of labor, calculated as annual wage and benefit expenses per employee; 1
P   = price of funding, calculated as average interest costs per dollar of all deposits; 2
P   = price of physical capital, calculated as annual expenses on premises and equipment 3
divided by the stock of these items;
X  = number of banks in MSA in one specification, and HHI in an alternate  1
specification;
X   = population of MSA divided by 100,000; 2
X   = percentage of population above 18 years old graduated from high school; 3
We imposed the usual restrictions of symmetry and linear homogeneity in factor prices:
 =  ,    =  ,      = 1,      = 0 for all i, and      = 0 for all k. ik ki jk kj j j ij j jk22
Cost minimization implies the following factor share equations according to Shephard’s lemma:
(10)      =     +    P +     Q    for j = 1 to 3 jjj k ki j i
                         k                   i
where   is the proportion of total cost spent on factor j.  To avoid singularity, the capital share j
equation was omitted.  The remaining share equations were jointly estimated with (9) to improve
efficiency, using seemingly unrelated regression.  We did not correct for possible heteroscedasticity,
following standard practice in the empirical cost literature as well as Mishkin’s (1990) analysis, which
indicates that such adjustments can actually degrade statistical inference.
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Within this specification, the hypothesis of network diseconomies would predict a positive
coefficient   on the number of banks in the market, or a negative coefficient on the HHI. 1
Urbanization economies would show up as a negative coefficient   on population, although 2
congestion costs could lead to the reverse finding.  A negative coefficient   on the high school 3
graduation variable could reflect higher productivity of a better-educated workforce.
Results
Table 2 shows the estimated regression coefficients and t-statistics.  The fit is good for each
subsample, with adjusted R-squares ranging from 0.89 to 0.95.  Most of the coefficients are
statistically nonzero at conventional levels.  The marginal cost of each output is positive in both
regressions at sample mean values of input prices and output levels, as indicated by positive point
estimates of  , consistent with monotonicity of the cost function.  Likewise, predicted factor cost i
shares were positive at all sample values of the regressors in each regression, as required by
monotonicity.  A chi-square test rejected separability of the cost function at the 0.99 level.
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The coefficient on the number of banks,  , is significantly positive at the 0.01 level for both 1
the branch bank and unit bank samples.  Similarly, the coefficient on HHI is significantly negative at
the 0.01 level for both samples.  These results suggest that a typical bank faces higher costs when its
primary geographic market area contains a larger number of other banks, consistent with the theory
presented in the previous section.  In the nomenclature of the literature on agglomeration economies,
this effect corresponds to "localization diseconomies" where localization refers to the size of the
industry within the community rather than the size of the community itself.  The magnitude of the
estimated effect appears modest at the individual bank level, with each additional bank increasing the
cost of a branching bank incumbent by 3 basis points, or of a unit bank incumbent by 4 basis points.
At the sample mean cost figures, the corresponding annual cost of an additional rival would be $3000
to a branching bank and $2000 to a unit bank.  
These figures, while seemingly small, imply substantial aggregate networking costs.
Comparing the implied cost of the sample mean market structure with that of an alternative
(counterfactual) monopoly structure, we find that the average branching bank has costs that are higher
by 2.24 percent (or nearly $229,000 per year) than in the monopoly structure, while the average unit
bank has costs that are higher by 3.85 percent (or $201,000 per year) than in the monopoly structure.
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Taking the lower dollar figure times the branch bank average of 75 banks per MSA implies an annual
cost of bank networking of at least $15 million per MSA on average.  Aggregated across all 292 MSAs
in the sample, this figure implies nationwide networking costs of nearly $4.4 billion per year, or about
1.4 percent of the 1990 aggregate banking costs of $320 billion.  Structural consolidation could reduce
or eliminate these networking costs but would not necessarily result in an overall cost saving if there
are diseconomies of scale at the firm level.  24
These estimates reflect only local bank presence and thus exclude any cost of networking with
out-of-market banks.  Actual networking costs should therefore exceed these estimates.  Although not
every bank will interact with every other bank across the country, and out-of-market interactions will
typically be weaker than intramarket interactions, the sheer number of banks (more than 12,000 across
the U.S. in the sample year) suggests that the omitted component of networking costs could also be
substantial.
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Though alternative explanations besides interfirm network diseconomies could account for the
observed sign of  , some explanations can be ruled out.  For example, if banks in concentrated 1
markets exert monopsony power, bank costs would be higher in markets containing many banks
because wages and deposit interest rates would be higher in those markets.  However, our regressions
control for input prices so, whether or not our sample exhibits monopsony power, this hypothesis
cannot explain the positive estimate of  .  Another possible explanation involves agency costs in 1
unconcentrated markets (Martin, 1993); our data cannot distinguish between this cause and network
costs.  In general, the implications of our results for network diseconomies should be regarded as
suggestive rather than definitive.
Agglomeration Variables
Although the variables X  and X  are control variables unrelated to our hypothesis of network 23
diseconomies, they are standard agglomeration variables with potential economic significance in their
own right.  The significantly negative coefficient on population indicates that banks face lower costs
in larger cities, ceteris paribus, so that congestion effects appear to be more than offset by urbanization
economies.  One reason may be that a larger community permits information aggregation across25
borrowers that reduces a bank’s unit costs of credit analysis.  The estimated magnitude of this effect
is twice as great for unit banks as for branch banks: increasing an MSA’s population by 1 million
reduces the cost of an average branch bank by a bit less than 2 percent and that of an average unit bank
by about 3½ percent.  Together with the positive estimate of  , this result suggests that localization 1
effects and urbanization effects tend to go in opposite directions within the banking industry. 
The high school graduation variable was negative and strongly significant for both samples,
indicating that banks have lower costs in better-educated communities.  One possible explanation
could be that better educated workers are more productive for a given wage rate.   
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Other properties of the cost function
Although it is not the primary focus of this paper to explore economies of scale or scope as
conventionally measured, our estimates provide some information relevant to those issues.  A chi-
square test rejected constant returns to scale at the 0.99 level.   The scale elasticity of cost, defined
20
as SEC =    M ln C / M ln q, is a common measure of ray scale economies.  At the sample mean scale ii
and input prices, its point estimate equals 0.957 for branch banks and 0.933 for unit banks, implying
some economies of scale within this range for both samples.  More generally, at sample mean input
prices, the SEC was found to be:
(11) SEC = 0.957 + 0.102 Q  + 0.070 Q  + 0.105 Q  + 0.169 Q and 1234
(12) SEC = 0.933 + 0.091 Q  + 0.060 Q  + 0.080 Q + 0.235 Q 133  426
for branch and unit banks, respectively.  The estimates indicate statistically significant pairwise cost
complementarities among all pairs of outputs in both samples, with the sole exception of consumer
loans and other loans at unit banks, as implied by the   coefficients.  Table 3 displays the output ik
levels at which ray scale economies are exhausted for each output, calculated at sample mean values
of input prices and of other output levels.  These values are large compared with those found by most
previous studies, especially with regard to consumer loans (see Berger and Humphrey, 1992b, for a
survey), but a few studies have found similar or even unlimited minimum efficient scales (e.g.,
Shaffer, 1994).  As noted above, our sample is less subject to econometric problems from skewness
and a large range of scale than are many previous studies; to the extent that these differences
contribute to the different findings, the results here may be more indicative of the actual cost structure.
Other differences between our sample and previously studied samples may also contribute to the
different estimates of efficient scale; for example, it may be that single-market banks have a larger
efficient scale than multimarket banks.  However, because our estimated minimum efficient scale lies
beyond the upper bound of the sample range, these numbers represent an extrapolation that should not
be regarded as definitive.
Although theoretical analysis in a previous section indicated that network diseconomies could
distort conventional firm-level measures of scale economies where each firm’s scale is erroneously
interpreted as independent of the number of local rivals, this distortion did not appear to be large in
the present sample.  Replicating the regressions in Table 2 after omitting the number of banks in the
same MSA yielded coefficient estimates that were essentially unchanged in sign and significance.
Many of the coefficients, especially those critical to measures of scale or scope economies, were also
nearly unchanged in magnitude.  The scale elasticity of cost in these alternate regressions was27
estimated as 0.957 and 0.934, respectively, for the branch bank and unit bank samples at the sample
mean values of the input prices.  As noted above, the use of dollar-based output measures is likely to
be a major factor in explaining the small magnitude of this distortion, given that the number of local
rivals will mainly affect the number of a bank’s payment transactions rather than the size of its loan
or deposit base.
4.  Conclusion
This paper has introduced the concept of network diseconomies associated with the intrinsic
need for multiple firms within an industry to interface with each other in the provision of the industry’s
primary service.  Several industries were discussed as possible examples, and a formal theoretical
model characterized transaction accounts as a source of network diseconomies in the banking industry.
Further analysis established conditions under which the socially optimal industry structure is more
concentrated than that corresponding to either the minimum average cost point for each firm (locally
constant returns to scale) or the free-entry equilibrium; a rough calibration of the model suggests that
some of these conditions may hold for the U.S. banking industry.  An additional example particularly
relevant to the payments system demonstrated that interfirm linkages can result in a natural monopoly
despite constant returns to scale at the firm level as conventionally measured.  These various results
demonstrate that the concept of network diseconomies can have important public policy implications.
In addition, some simple empirical tests were presented to explore in a general way whether
data from the U.S. banking industry are consistent with the possibility of network diseconomies.  The
empirical model also incorporated a test for agglomeration effects, which appears to be the first
application of such a test to the banking industry.  Evidence consistent with both network28
diseconomies and agglomeration effects was found, with branch banks and unit banks exhibiting
localization diseconomies and urbanization economies.
The potential relevance of network diseconomies to understanding structural trends and
informing public policy may be increasing due to recent or ongoing developments in several
industries.  Within the U.S., competition in the telecommunication industry and deregulation in the
airline industry is only a few years old, with lessons still being learned.  Endogenous structural
consolidation in the banking industry, in Europe and the U.S., often appears at odds with the standard
interpretations of conventional cost studies (Berger and Humphrey, 1992b).  The continued erosion
of geographic market barriers and the globalization of many industries, including banking, is imposing
the need for a widening sphere of interfirm networking in the normal course of business. 
To the extent that the costs of increased networking offset the widely recognized benefits of
broader market integration, the effects identified in this paper may suggest an upper limit to the
beneficial degree of globalization.  Previous studies have identified other impediments to integration,
including costs associated with potential mismanagement of assets (Williamson, 1985), influence
costs (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990), and other agency costs (Olsen, 1996), but these studies have
focused on intrafirm integration.  The effects identified in this paper both add to the list of recognized
barriers to integration and extend the research on such barriers to interfirm and market integration.
Moreover, since broader integration of markets in any industry will generally necessitate
corresponding linkages in the payments and communication systems, a complete accounting of
interfirm networking costs must include these factors even where they are ancillary to the industry in
question.  In these and similar instances, further research on the effects of network diseconomies may
be needed both to quantify the problems and to identify solutions. 2930
Table 1
Summary Statistics
Variable Branch Banks              Unit Banks                  
Mean Standard Mean Standard
Deviation Deviation
Log (total cost) 9.232 0.888 8.561 0.772
Commercial loans 35841 56648 18756 37219
Consumer loans 20791 47763 10587 38339
Other loans 54540 92087 22974 61943
Securities and 
fed funds sold 55857 89778 29307 53539
Wage rate 27.93 6.02 29.41 7.16
Deposit interest rate 0.072 0.007 0.071 0.007
Price of physical 
capital 0.373 0.287 0.489 0.501
Number of 
banks in MSA 75.1 85.4 95.5 90.2
Population of MSA
(100,000) 17.87 20.69 18.48 21.17
Percentage of high 
school graduates 0.774 0.062 0.787 0.065
(Output levels are in $000.)31
Table 2
Regression Results
Branch Banks                                   Unit Banks                                 
Coeff. Est. (t-stat.) Est. (t-stat.) Est.  (t-stat.) Est. (t-stat.)
 9.995 (213.41*) 10.015  (209.22*) 9.278 (98.87*) 9.316 (95.77*) o
 0.197 (30.65*) 0.196 (30.49*) 0.235 (19.83*) 0.233 (19.75*) 1
    0.159 (28.62*) 0.161 (28.80*) 0.177 (19.67*) 0.179 (19.85*) 2
    0.321 (47.61*) 0.317 (47.46*) 0.265 (21.87*) 0.263 (21.95*) 3
    0.280 (36.53*) 0.283 (37.10*) 0.256 (16.80*) 0.261 (17.46*) 4
   0.204 (115.85*) 0.204 (115.97*) 0.215 (59.74*) 0.214 (59.79*) 1
   0.532 (185.50*) 0.532 (185.51*) 0.525 (87.73*) 0.525 (87.68*) 2
    0.102 (16.14*) 0.101 (15.98*) 0.091 (8.84*) 0.088 (8.68*) 11
    -0.019 (-4.71*) -0.019 (-4.57*) -0.015 (-2.55*) -0.015 (-2.54**) 12
    -0.042 (-8.98*) -0.042 (-9.03*) -0.028 (-3.92*) -0.029 (-4.03*) 13
-0.060 (-9.40*) -0.059 (-9.28*) -0.071 (-6.14*) -0.068 (-5.97*) 14
0.070 (19.23*) 0.070 (19.20*) 0.060 (11.48*) 0.060 (11.53*) 22
-0.016 (-4.44*) -0.016 (-4.41*) 0.013 (2.10**) 0.013 (2.20**) 23
-0.036 (-7.03*) -0.035 (-6.98*) -0.049 (-5.50*) -0.049 (-5.53*) 24
0.105 (25.24*) 0.103 (24.89*) 0.080 (13.18*) 0.080 (13.18*) 33
-0.040 (-5.72*) -0.038 (-5.54*)  -0.054 (-4.85*)  -0.054 (-4.91*) 34
0.169 (16.24*) 0.167 (16.08*) 0.235 (10.86*) 0.233 (10.82*) 44
-0.002 (-1.11) -0.002 (-1.11) 0.007 (2.45**) 0.007 (2.47**) 11
0.002 (0.70) 0.002 (0.75) -0.010 (-2.23**) -0.010 (-2.20**) 12
0.005 (3.41*) 0.005 (3.38*) 0.005 (2.24**) 0.005 (2.25**) 21
-0.017 (-7.86*) -0.017 (-7.98*) -0.018 (-5.36*) -0.018 (-5.35*) 22
-0.006 (-3.69*) -0.006 (-3.68*) -0.006 (-2.04**) -0.005 (-1.98**) 31
0.008 (3.30*) 0.008 (3.34*) 0.010 (2.40**) 0.011 (2.51**) 32
-0.012 (-5.81*) -0.012 (-5.82*) -0.024 (-6.37*) -0.024 (-6.48*) 41
0.018 (5.63*) 0.018 (5.65*) 0.025 (4.40*) 0.024 (4.26*) 42
-0.141 (-19.86*) -0.142 (-20.01*) -0.119 (-10.02*) -0.119 (-10.06*) 12
0.027 (11.51*) 0.027 (11.52*) 0.016 (4.82*) 0.016 (4.80*) 13
-0.055 (-14.94*) -0.054 (-14.92*) -0.051 (-9.69*) -0.051 (-9.70*) 23
=# banks .00030 (3.90*) -- .00040 (2.59*) -- 1
= HHI  -- -0.245 (-4.15*) -- -0.376 (-2.90*) 1 
-.00187 (-5.79*) -.00116 (-5.91*) -.00348 (-5.03*) -.00240 (-6.22*) 2
-0.322 (-5.38*) -0291 (-4.98*) -0.520 (-4.40*) -0.486 (-4.30*) 3
n 1971 1971 877 877
R-adj. 0.95 0.95 0.89 0.89
*significant at 0.01 level. ** significant at 0.05 level.  32
Table 3
Sizes at which Ray Scale Economies Are Exhausted for Each Output
(calculated at sample mean values of input prices and other output levels)
             Branch Banks                               Unit Banks                   
Output Multiple of $ Billions Multiple of $ Billions
Sample Mean Sample Mean
Commercial
Loans 2564 91.9 4362 81.8
Consumer
Loans 162,000 3368 918,900 9728
Other Loans 646.1 35.2 10,115 232.4
Securities and
fed funds sold 71.07 4.0 23.64 0.733
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1.  Gehrig (1996) analyzes a form of networking in an intermediation industry with consumer search
costs, showing that investment by firms in information networks for marketing purposes can reduce
the equilibrium degree of industry concentration.  Although banking is a clear example of an
intermediation industry, Gehrig’s model has a completely different focus from ours and consequently
reaches contrasting conclusions.  Gehrig models networks as linking firms to consumers rather than
firms to firms or consumers to consumers, analyzes consumer matching rather than costs, and
construes the size of the network as a quality attribute rather than as an exogenous market
characteristic.
2.  Some industries--such as telecommunications, electricity, gas, and water--have become known
as "network industries" because of their universal service mandate.  There is an imperfect overlap
between these industries and those under consideration in this paper, the major distinction being
that public utilities such as electricity, gas, and water do not intrinsically link consumers together,
but only provide a given service to each consumer.  In such cases, interfirm networking would not
be required even if the industry were not structured as a local monopoly.
3. Of course, the postal pricing structure could be altered to discourage the large volume of
commercial advertising, but the growth in the aggregate demand function for postal services has been
exogenous.
4.  The total number of assisted and unassisted mergers from 1980 through 1994 was 7103,
according to the FDIC’s Statistics on Banking, 1934-1994 (page A-10).  By the end of 1994 there
were 10,451 commercial banks in the U.S. (ibid.).
5.  At least two previous empirical studies have taken account of certain influences of networks on
the cost structure.  Caves et al. (1984) distinguish between economies of scale and economies of
density pertaining to airline routes.  Kim and Ben-Zion (1989) apply the same concept to banking
costs, reflecting the branching network of an individual bank.  The present study is distinguished
from these in its focus on the linkages among firms rather than those within a firm.
6.  Focusing on the cost of accounts and transactions corresponds to the so-called "production
model" of a banking firm in which output is measured as the number of accounts.  This approach
has been used in some empirical banking cost studies such as Gilligan et al. (1984) and Ferrier and
Lovell (1990).  The alternative "intermediation model" (Sealey and Lindley, 1977), along with its
variants such as the user-cost model (Hancock, 1985) and the value-added model (Berger and
Footnotes37
Humphrey, 1992a), has seen more use in recent empirical banking cost studies.  These latter
models measure scale in terms of the dollar volume of various subsets of assets and liabilities
(which is reported for all banks), rather than the number of accounts (which is not reported for
most banks).  There is a strong positive relationship between the number of accounts and the dollar
volume.
7.  If anything, it seems reasonable to expect the number of transactions per account to increase with
the number of other accounts in the economy.  Otherwise, the implicit assumption is that, as the
number of accounts in the economy grows, original accounts do not interact at all with new accounts.
Thus, the assumption of proportionality is conservative with respect to network diseconomies.
8.  Previous research has also noted the distinction between stocks and flows in the various measures
of bank output; see for example Humphrey (1992).
9.  Conversely, the socially optimal structure is characterized by locally constant returns to scale at
the firm level as conventionally measured, if and only if the left-hand side of expression (6) equals
the right-hand side, a condition that is satisfied only on a set of measure zero.  Thus, the socially
optimal structure nearly always entails some deviation from the minimum-average-cost firm scale
when there is interfirm networking.
10. McAndrews and Roberds maintain the assumption that the cost of an on-us transaction equals
that of a transit transaction, but note that this is not the most realistic case.
11.  Alternative versions of the model were also estimated corresponding to the value-added model
and the user-cost model, yielding results that were qualitatively and quantitatively similar.
12.   MSAs in New England typically do not follow county boundaries and were replaced by New
England County Metro Areas (NECMAs) in this study.
13.  Kim and Ben-Zion (1989) define a bank’s branches as a component of scale economies,
requiring that the number of branches be included as a regressor.  While this approach was
appropriate for the focus of their study, it is not standard practice in the empirical banking
literature because of equilibrium expansion path arguments (see Berger et al., 1987), and is38
therefore not included in our model.
14.  Some banks did not report a sufficient level of detail to be included in the model as specified,
and these banks were excluded from the sample.
15.  The Pearson correlation coefficient between cost residuals and total bank assets was 0.025 for
the unit bank sample (not significantly different from zero) and 0.049 for the branch bank sample
(significantly different from zero at the 0.03 level but still small in magnitude).  These figures
suggest that any monotonic pattern of heteroscedasticity in our sample is minimal.
16.  The test statistics were 124 for branch banks and 277 for unit banks; the 0.99 critical value for
chi-square with 8 degrees of freedom is 20.1.
17.  The calculation is [exp(9.232 + (75 x 0.0002994)) / exp(9.232 + (1 x 0.0002994))] = 1.0224
for branching banks, and similarly for unit banks, where the mean number of banks per MSA is 75
for branching banks and 95 for unit banks.
18.  Testing this broader aspect of networking costs would require a pooled time series / cross-
sectional sample to obtain variation in the number of banks nationwide.  The availability of
relevant Census data only at 10-year intervals precludes the practical construction of such a test.
19.  Another possible factor might be that better educated borrowers have lower delinquency and
default rates, requiring less costly credit monitoring by the bank and imposing lower loan
chargeoffs.  We did not attempt to distinguish empirically among these potential explanations.
20.  The test statistics were 657 for branch banks and 2042 for unit banks; the 0.99 critical value of
the chi-square with 11 degrees of freedom is 24.7.